A Regulatory Framework for a Policy of Sustainability: Lessons from the Neo-Liberal School by Rennings, Klaus et al.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Rennings, Klaus; Koschel, Henrike; Brockmann, Karl Ludwig; Kühn, Isabel
Working Paper
A Regulatory Framework for a Policy of
Sustainability: Lessons from the Neo-Liberal School
ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 97-13
Provided in cooperation with:
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Suggested citation: Rennings, Klaus; Koschel, Henrike; Brockmann, Karl Ludwig; Kühn, Isabel
(1997) : A Regulatory Framework for a Policy of Sustainability: Lessons from the Neo-Liberal
School, ZEW Discussion Papers, No. 97-13, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24688Discussion Paper No. 97/13
A Regulatory Framework for a Policy of






A Regulatory Framework for a Policy of




Klaus Rennings, Henrike Koschel, Karl Ludwig Brockmann, Isabel Kühn
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
1997
Correspondence to:
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)






                                          
1  This article is a revised version of a paper prepared for the German Federal Ministry of
Economics under the title „Ordnungspolitische Grundfragen einer Politik für eine nachhaltige,
zukunftsverträgliche Entwicklung“ ( „Basic Questions of Regulatory Policy for Sustainable
Development“). An earlier version of this work was published in 1996, in the book
„Nachhaltigkeit, Ordnungspolitik und freiwillige Selbstverpflichtung“ ( „Sustainability,
Regulatory Policies and Voluntary Agreements“) by Klaus Rennings, Karl Ludwig Brockmann,
Henrike Koschel, Heidi Bergmann and Isabel Kühn in the „ZEW Environmental and Resource
Economics Series „ published by Springer Verlag (Physica), Heidelberg, Germany.IVVVI
Abstract
In this paper targets, institutions and policy measures for describing and
implementing sustainable development are evaluated in terms of their conformity
with the economic framework of a market system. Firstly, from the viewpoint of
neo-liberal economic thinking as conceived by the German Freiburg school of
economists (Eucken), a general set of criteria is developed, including issues of
operationalization and legitimation of goals as well as institutional and instrumental
issues. On this basis general rules for designing an ecological framework
guaranteeing the greatest possible degree of conformity with a market system are
derived. The concrete application of these rules leads to recommendations for a
policy of sustainability with respect to the setting of goals, the establishment of
institutions (role of ecological councils, of a central environmental organization on
UN level and of the GATT/WTO regime) as well as the use of appropriate
instruments.
Keywords: sustainability targets, regulatory rules, neo-liberal framework,
environment and international trade, environmental policy assessment
JEL Classifikation: Q 58VIIVIII
Non technical summary
The model of a social market economy has been constituted as an answer to the
social question of the 19th and 20th centuries. The idea was to have a social
framework underpinning an economic system designed primarily for competitive
endeavour. Today, proponents of what is called sustainable development develop
similar proposals for solving the social (especially in developing countries) and
ecological crisis of the 20th century. Questions of designing a sustainable economy
are mainly discussed within the interdisciplinary stream of ecological economics.
This paper is designed as an attempt to develop a liberal approach for embedding
the basic thinking of ecological economics into a concept of political regulation. To
evaluate in terms of their regulatory efficacy the goals, institutions and measures for
describing and implementing sustainable development, the first requirement is a set
of check criteria. An analytical raster of this kind is formulated in this paper, and
comprises the following steps: goal operationalization and legitimization,
institutionalization, and instrumentation:
− In developing a goal system, it is crucial to define consistent subgoals,
demonstrably able to correct the deficits of a pure free-market system.
− When selecting the decision-making level, the primary consideration must be to
find a balance between the subsidiarity and congruence principles. While the
subsidiarity principle basically favours decentralized solutions, the criterion of
objective congruence demands that global problems be tackled on the level of
supranational institutions.
− Finally, any assessment of instruments will in terms of regulatory efficacy
concentrate on criteria of effectiveness (goal-conformity), necessity (system-
conformity), economic efficiency, and institutional controllability.
The way in which sustainability goals are formulated is highly relevant in terms of
regulatory policy-making. Starting from regulatory considerations, maximally
differentiated, impact-oriented policy goals (i.e. environmental quality indicators)
must be paramount in any system of sustainability indicators. The less specifically
the goals of sustainable economic management are defined, the more likely they are
to result in concepts of dubious regulatory utility, tending towards blanket
restrictions in economic activities and economic growth as such. Formulation of
sustainability goals must therefore satisfy the principle of necessity and the
postulate of maximising freedom under given ecological restrictions
If these basic principles are followed, the targets derived from them can be
legitimized, even when applying strictly neo-liberal criteria for evaluating economicIX
policy measures. Reduction targets of this kind do not (despite recurrent warnings
to the contrary) signify a descent into an eco-dictatorship, but quite the reverse: a
necessary expansion of liberal constitutions for the economy. A conclusion drawn
from the insight that the market cannot of itself guarantee the preservation of
ecological support capacity. Ensuring ecological carrying capacity thus additionally
demands a framework of sustainability.
Institutional implementation of the principles of sustainable development is
primarily characterized by the ambivalent relationship between the equivalence and
congruence principles. From a regulatory viewpoint, decentralized solutions should
always be given preference. Global change, however, entails a heightened necessity
for international coordination.
As yet there have been no totally persuasive proposals for the establishment of
ecological councils capable of assuming long-term responsibilities in democratic
decision-making processes otherwise focused on the short term. The fundamental
problems involved in these proposals usually stem from the inadequate democratic
legitimization of such councils, and in over-ambitious ideas concerning the
scientific expertise of the members concerned, which would have to cover all the
specialized fields involved  in sustainable development. It would appear more
sensible to strengthen the existing councils and commissions.
Regarding the institutional revamping of global environmental policy-making, in
view of the sheer scope of the job and the responsibilities involved for a policy of
sustainability, it appears advisable to create a new, central organization for global
environmental and resource protection.
The deficits and ambiguities of the GATT/WTO regime in regard to environmental
problems highlight the necessity for an ecological reform. One example is offered
by the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), which establishes a free
trade zone between the USA, Canada and Mexico. Environmental aspects were of
some importance for congressional approval, so that a relatively sophisticated body
of rules had to be created. It can be foreseen that the topic of foreign trade and the
environment will take on major importance in future GATT/WTO negotiating
rounds. The objective should be to seize this opportunity to put through substantive
reforms which are outlined in this study.
An analysis of environmental policy instruments in terms of their regulatory
efficacy requires that they be evaluated against a variety of problem constellations.
Not only must a distinction be drawn here between averting dangers and making
provision for risks; the nature of the market’s failure in each case (external costs,
inflexibility, lack of information) and the level of informed public opinion on
possible environmental damage must also be taken into account.1
1 Introduction
The model of a social market economy has been constituted as an answer to the
social question of the 19th and 20th centuries. The idea was to have a social
framework underpinning an economic system designed primarily for
competitive endeavour. Today, proponents of what is called an ecological
market economy develop similar proposals for solving the ecological crisis of
the 20th century. With the idea of an ecological framework, economists
delegated the problem of defining ecological goals almost entirely to the
politicians and scientists, while they devoted themselves primarily to
developing instruments of maximized efficiency for externally specified goals
formulated by environmental policy-makers.
Ecological economics attempts to break away from the present fixations with
instruments as such. It rather takes a step backwards, aiming first to achieve
better comprehension for ecological/economic causal interrelationships and the
basic ethics involved, so as not to obliterate the problems precipitately with
conventional economic nostrums. One pertinent introduction to questions of
ecological economics puts it like this: „We must transcend the focus on tools
and techniques so that we avoid being ‘a person with a hammer to whom
everything looks like a nail’“ (COSTANZA, DALY AND BARTHOLOMEW, 1991, 3).
The main focus of the sustainable development concept, the predominant
concern of ecological economics, is thus to describe the problems and define the
relevant goals.
This paper is designed as an attempt to develop a liberal approach for
embedding the basic thinking of ecological economics into a concept of
political regulation. Fundamental questions of regulatory policy geared to viable
sustainability can be identified on several different levels:
− Substantive level: to assess the relevance of particular recommendations for a
policy of sustainability, the first necessity is to concretize the goal system
involved in sustainable development by means of appropriate criteria and
indicators.
− Institutional level: besides the formulation of substantive goals, studies must
also examine what institutions must be created with what prerogatives on
what decision-making level, to enable them not merely to formulate, but also
to implement these goals in the ongoing political process.
− Instrumental level: consideration must also be given to whether the measures
recommended within the framework of concepts for sustainable development
accord with the system-inherent characteristics of a social market economy,2
or whether they run unduly counter to free-enterprise rules as societal
coordinating mechanisms.
The different levels are integrated into this paper as follows: after clarification
of the term „sustainability“ (Chapter 2), a catalogue of criteria is developed
against which recommended policies can be assessed in terms of their
contribution to implementing sustainability (goal-conformity) and also in regard
to their conformity with the model of a social market economy (system-
conformity) (Chapter 3). Against these criteria, the paper examines how the
sustainability model can be operationally formulated, and legitimized in terms
of regulatory policies (Chapter 4). Chapters 5 and 6, finally, apply the paradigm
criteria to the institutional and instrumental levels, by asking on what decision-
making level the model must be implemented by what bodies, programmes,
instruments and action.
2 Definitions and concepts of sustainable development
Among the many definitions for the concept of sustainable development, the
simplest and most general comes from the Brundtland Commission, which
describes a development sustainable when it „meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs“
(HAUFF, 1987, 46).
2 Since the concept of sustainable development plays a
central role in international environmental and development policy-making,
economists are also endeavouring to formulate a more general definition of this
term going beyond former, narrow definitions in resource economics. PEARCE
and TURNER (1990, 43 ff.) define development as a positive societal change, i.e.
an empty formula for which society must provide the substantive meaning.
3
Their concept of sustainability demands a constant level of nature's capital
stock.
                                          
2 It is important to remember that the definitions in the Brundtland Report explicitly
represent an anthropocentric position, which legitimates the goal of a sustainable
development from rational reasons and considerations of fairness. In a pluralist society,
biocentric or religious justifications for sustainability above and beyond this will hardly be
amenable to conversion into generally binding rules (HAMPICKE, 1991, 99).
3 Elements in the development vector can, for instance, include per capita income,
infrastructural facilities, education, income distribution, health, personal liberties or the
quality of the environment. The wider the definition of this concept, the more problems are
involved in adequately measuring it. A development is designated as sustainable when the
value of the development vector does not decrease over time. Pearce and Turner extend the
concept of sustainability to include the consumption of exhaustible resources and the
environment’s function as a medium for absorbing pollutants.3
Depending on whether the demand for a constant capital stock is referenced to
nature in the narrower sense of the term or whether under a broader
interpretation it signifies merely a constant level in the nation’s economic
capital stock overall (which in most cases will implicitly presuppose the
exchangeability of artificial and natural capital), concepts of weak and strong
sustainability can be distinguished (RENNINGS AND WIGGERING, 1996).
4 While
most neo-classical environmental economists advocate a position of weak
sustainability, proponents of ecological economics tend to accept absolute limits
of ecosystem functions, especially of some critical essential functions like
climate stability. These limits constitute a central element in the overall concept.
Thus, Daly (1992, 185 ff.) distinguishes between three fundamental, separable
tasks of economic policy: allocation, distribution and scale. Within this
approach, the scale issue addressing the demand for taking ecosystem limits
into account gets the highest degree of priority.
3 Analytical raster for assessing a policy of sustainability
The German Freiburg school of neo-liberal economists holds that the absence of
markets, and any functional defects of existing markets, will result in corrective
requirements which cannot be covered solely by an evolutionary competition of
institutions - a view which will be pursued here below. This school regards as
inadequate the process of natural selection emerging from international
competition between institutions evolving as a quasi-random process, but not
specified by the state, and the resultant elimination of inefficient institutional
bodies. On the contrary, the Freiburg neo-liberals’ concept of a free-enterprise
economy presupposes that the state must selectively create institutions for
countering existing defects and challenges (GROSSEKETTLER, 1991, 104 ff.).
The efficiency of such institutions must be measured in terms of how far the
principles of free enterprise are respected.
IN THIS CONTEXT, GROSSEKETTLER (1991, 110 ff.) distinguishes between basic
and evolutionary principles. Basic principles represent the necessary conditions
                                          
4  The concept of weak sustainability has its roots in neo-classical welfare theory, and merely
demands a constant level in the nation’s economic capital stock overall, thus in principle
permitting artificial capital to be substituted for natural resources. Losses in utility caused
by increasing environmental impairment (e.g. tree death) can thus be compensated by
growths in utility arising from human-generated capital (e.g. savings). In the concept of
weak sustainability, therefore, the costs of environmental impact are used as indicators for
actual losses in welfare. The concept of strong sustainability, conversely, rules out any
complete substitutability between natural and artificial capital, and emphasizes the absolute
limits of usability applying to natural resources. The impact limits for natural resources are
accordingly measured in physical variables.4
for a rudimentary form of a free-market economy, i.e. for a rudimentary
regulatory organization of its mechanisms. Examples would be the right to
private property and the principle of liberty to contract. The fundamental task of
regulatory policies in a free-market economy is to defend, promote or establish
these basic principles, so as to maintain the stability and efficiency of the free-
market process.
The evolutionary principles, conversely, represent procedural rules for
determining  „legitimate“ measures designed to develop/improve the
rudimentary regulatory framework already existing. It is regarded as essential to
supplement these basic principles, since (as explained above) in the Freiburg
school's paradigm the state is required to respond selectively in order to counter
certain of the system's inherent defects and to master exogenous challenges.
This would primarily include:
− functional deficits in existing markets (e.g. dominated markets),
− deficits arising from the absence of markets (e.g., as addressed in the concept
of sustainable development, environmental problems or distribution patterns
perceived as unfair).
The regulatory model of a free-enterprise competitive economy favours a
strategy of maximized freedom; this means that in the elimination of market
imperfections a maximization of the transactors' freedoms is both statically and
dynamically targeted (EWERS AND HASSEL, 1995, 13 ff.).
Table 1 presents a generalized analytical raster comprising, in broad conformity
with the evolutionary principles mentioned by GROSSEKETTLER and with the
assessment scheme he presents, a catalogue of check criteria applying to the
selection of instruments for eliminating deficits in a liberal market economy.
5
The criteria will be described in the following chapters. In principle, the raster
would have to be applied separately for each single policy instruments.
6 Within
this paper, however, we will focus on some basic questions of a policy of
sustainable development.
                                          
5 cf.  RENNINGS ET AL. 1996 for a detailed explanation of the criteria involved.
6  Rennings, Brockmann and Bergmann  (1997) have applied the analytical raster for assessing
negotiated agreements in Germany.5
Table 1: Systematized check criteria for evaluating economic policy measures in terms of
regulatory efficieny from a liberal perspecitve
Step 1: Goal formulation and operationalization:
−  Formulating the targeted goal system
−  Indicators
−  Assignment of goals, means and implementing agencies
Step 2: Legitimization of the action’s goal in terms of contract theory:
−  Hypothetical justification (Rawls)
−  Reference to concludent action
Step 3: Selection of the decision-making level/process:
−  Subsidiarity principle
−  Congruence principle:
−  Equivalence: the user group must coincide with the payer group for a collective
good
−  Democratic monitoring: the group of the decision-impacted must coincide with
the group of entitled monitorers
Step 4: Economic legitimization of actions formulated:
−  Choice of instruments: selection of conceivable instruments for goal
implementation
−  Effectiveness (goal-conformity):
−  Degree of goal attainment (direction and dosage)
−  Speed of goal attainment
−  Invariance against changes in the macro-economic boundary conditions
−  Necessity (system-conformity):
−  Market-conformity:
−  Instrumental subsidiarity: designing measures with minimized impact on
individuals’ powers of decision-making (centralized/decentralized)
−  creation of fully functional markets (free price formation, fully functional
competition)
−  Minimizing intervention into the functioning of existing markets
−  Priority of regulatory before process policy: formulation of a long-term
orientation framework, and avoidance of stop-and-go measures
−  Minimization of detectable unwanted side-effects:
−  Stability-policy goals (economic compatibility)
−  Distribution-policy goals (social compatibility)
−  Economic efficiency:
−  Static economic efficiency (cost-efficiency):
−  Purpose/avoidance costs
−  Transaction costs
−  Dynamic economic efficiency (innovation efficiency)
−  Institutional controllability: implementability in the political process and allowance
for the possibilities for abuse in the political/administrative apparatus
Source: In broad conformity with GROSSEKETTLER (1991, P. 114 f.).6
4 Elements, criteria and indicators for describing
sustainability
This chapter deals with the first two substeps in regulatory-policy analysis. It
begins with an operational definition of the ecological, social and economic
criteria for sustainability. These subcomponents are then re-integrated to enable
actual welfare coefficients or reduction targets for environmental/resource
consumption to be derived. The goals are operationalized, and legitimized both
empirically and in terms of the theory of justice.
4.1  Ecological development
4.1.1  Management rules and safe-minimum standard
The ecological component of a sustainability concept inheres in the demand that
social development shall move inside the limits set by nature, i.e. the ecological
support capacity (SRU, 1994, Tz. 10). The concept of ecological support
capacity, however, in many of the relevant publications either remains a very
general one or is interpreted in numerous different ways.
Pearce and Turner have developed the concept of a constant natural capital
stock for natural resources. This means that in order to ensure that subsequent
generations are not worse off, the amount of natural capital must be kept at a
constant level. The concept formulates three fundamental rules of management,
which have to be followed if a constant stock of natural capital is to be
maintained (PEARCE AND TURNER, 1990, 43 ff.):
− The use of renewable resources should not exceed their rate of regeneration.
− Exhaustible resources may be consumed only if equivalent alternatives are
created, i.e. if they can be replaced by technical advances, real capital and/or
renewable resources.
− Emissions must not exceed the environment’s natural capacity to absorb
them.
Once these three fundamental rules of management have been taken on board,
the next question is how to flesh them out with substantive content. After all,
even complete consumption of an exhaustible resource could be justified if
subsequent generations are not going to need the resource concerned, perhaps
because its functions can be provided by other means (e.g. by renewable
resources or machines). But this kind of substitution for natural resources will
in many cases, due to their multi-functionality, prove rather problematically.
While oil supplies, for example, essentially function as providers of a raw
material, and thus appear inherently replaceable, the conservation of species is
by contrast a multi-purpose concern. Seals and whales, for example, are most7
certainly amenable to substitution as providers of meat and fat, but in many
people’s view are irreplaceable in terms of their contribution to the richness of
aquatic ecosystems. Species and ecosystems thus do not bestow utility solely
through their direct utilization in the economic system (use value) but also and
primarily through the inherent value of their very existence (non-use value).
Due to the difficulty of deriving certain quantitative utilization limits from the
first two rules of management, the requirement is mostly reduced to assuring
defined minimum levels which must in no case be withheld from subsequent
generations. Ciriacy-Wantrup, for instance, in 1952 was the first to formulate
what is known as the safe-minimum standard. Under this approach, economic
activities must not be allowed to endanger essential elements of the biosphere in
their existence, irrespective of the particular circumstances involved
(HAMPICKE, 1991, 81). HAMPICKE (1992, 59) formulates a somewhat more
concrete approach for determining possible elements of a safe-minimum
standard.
To translate the third rule of management into a tool of practical use, the natural
absorption capacity has to be quantified. As indicators for the ecological
absorption capacity, the German Council of Environmental Advisors has
proposed determination of critical impact values, known as critical loads and
critical levels (SRU, 1994, Tz. 181 ff.). These impact limits must be specified
very precisely in both spatial and temporal terms for particular effects at
individual receptors. The critical levels/loads concept has been developed by
the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) to cover
various air pollutants. Here, critical levels designate critical concentrations of
air pollutants, while critical loads denote critical deposits. If impact is below the
critical levels and critical loads, then to present-day knowledge no damage to
receptors need be feared.
4.1.2  Entropy, material intensity and environmental indicators
The characteristic features of ecological systems and processes include their
dynamics, the intricacy of their interactions and their non-linearities
(TAPPEINER, 1993, 121 ff.). It is even more difficult to comprehend
interdependences between economic and ecological systems: in fact, this
becomes so complicated that scientific models attempt to reduce the complexity
involved by incorporating simplificatory assumptions.
In particular, the approaches for determining the ecological carrying capacity
are characterized by simplificatory assumptions of this kind. The carrying
capacity is the number of human beings who can be supplied with the existing
amount of renewable resources (VAN DIEREN, 1995, 130). According to MARKL
(1995, 7) the global support capacity „for early Stone Age cultures was not8
much more than 10 million people worldwide, while today’s figure is almost 6
billion.“ The problems involved in exceeding the ecological support capacity
are mostly addressed within a context of changes in environmental pollution,
using a simple, static formula for calculating the current environmental
pollution (U). As sources of environmental pollution the formula incorporates
the population figure (B), the per capita GNP ( Y
B
) and the environmental impact









To be totally precise, we are dealing with a tautology here. But breaking it down
into its individual components provides a vivid illustration of how substantially
some variables are going to have to change in order to avoid a deterioration in
the environmental situation as a result of assumed alterations in other variables.
To estimate sustainability, the usual practice as the next step is to make certain
assumptions on population increase and economic growth rates (WETERINGS
AND  OPSCHOOR, 1992, 5). The central control variable remaining is the
environmental impact per GNP unit, i.e. an increase in technical eco-efficiency.
This permits a (pretty rough) calculation of a factor (e.g. 10) by which this eco-
efficiency has to increase in order to ensure that the environmental impact does
not exceed an assumed ecological carrying capacity. Less commonly, economic
growth and the population level are incorporated as control variables.
It is noteworthy that the environmental impact is measured with a single figure.
In order to reduce the complexity of ecological effect relationships to a single
coefficient proponents of ecological economics frequently cite the Second Law
of Thermodynamics (the Law of Entropy), under which entropy increases in
practically all physical operations. However, it remains contentious whether the
Law of Entropy, formulated as it is for closed systems, is also relevant for open
ecological and economic systems where a negative entropy flow is possible
(BINSWANGER, 1993, 209 f.; YOUNG, 1991, 169 ff.).
Some proponents of ecological economics cite the Law of Entropy to
substantiate demands for restrictions on economic activities. For example, Daly
proposes the consumption of energy resources to indicate the ecological
carrying capacity  (DALY, 1992, 186). Another key figure in this context
(developed at Germany's Wuppertal Institute) is the material intensity of goods
and services (SCHMIDT-BLEEK, 1994).
The applicability of entropy-based approaches to explaining the
interdependences between economics and ecology does, however, remain very9
limited. Basically, they are demanding nothing more than a vaguely determined
level of ecological efficiency, but entropy coefficients do not permit
conclusions (still less quantified particulars) to be derived on various types of
environmental impact, e.g. different consequences from the greenhouse effect,
the urbanization of the countryside, or the toxicity of certain materials
(BINSWANGER, 1993, 227 f.).
By now it becomes clear that the way how to define and measure sustainability
is essential for designing the regulatory framework. In calculating the carrying
capacity the main focus is on the environment’s function as a provider of
material and energy. Political proposals arrived at on this basis will
consequently often demand restrictions on the input from production processes,
and sometimes even an across-the-board reduction in economic activities or
economic growth. If, however, we accept the postulate that for a properly
functioning competitive economy we will be well advised to maximize the
freedoms permitted to the transactors involved (EWERS AND HASSEL, 1995, 13
ff.), then reducing the input to the production process is at the very least a
dubious option, and should be chosen only for good reasons. Moreover, from an
ecologist’s viewpoint, a more obvious option is to formulate sustainability goals
tied as closely as possible to the goods concerned themselves (e.g. critical loads
and levels, climatic stability).
4.2  Social development
The general goal of just distribution of the environmental utilization
entitlements is concretized within the framework of the sustainability concept
by means of two fundamental postulates: the demand for intergenerational and
intragenerational justice. However, principles of equity and justice are
interpreted differently from a socialist (need-referenced), liberal (performance-
referenced) or conservative (vested-right-referenced) perspective. In most of the
concepts, these principles are intermingled.
4.2.1  The neo-classical concept of economic sustainability
Whereas questions of intragenerational justice go beyond the scope of neo-
classical welfare theory, there are concepts for intergenerationally optimized
allocation of renewable and exhaustible resources. But most of them will not be
compatible with sustainable utilization, since the preservation of resources in
the present will usually entail economic opportunity costs. To achieve a
sustainable management of resources, a longer-term perspective and more
responsive allowance for future generations’ preferences will normally be
required. This explains the occasional proposals to reduce the discount rate in
cost-benefit analyses, or to do away with discounting entirely, so as to express10
that present-day welfare should not be valued more highly than welfare in the
future.
Given an unlimited time horizon, however, a discount rate of zero will lead to
infinitely high external costs for economic activities, which in the final analysis
implies that today no resources should be utilized at all (PEARCE, 1993, 58). Nor
should it be forgotten that the interest rate represents the relative price of
capital, that any alteration in the interest rate will entail a change in relative
prices, and may thus impair the efficiency of economic allocation. It would,
therefore, appear more sensible to follow Daly’s approach in leaving the interest
rate inviolate as an instrument of allocation, but setting ecological limits for the
market. This does, however, not mean that discount rates must be constant over
time. Time-variant, decreasing discount rates as proposed by Rabl (1996) and
Azar/Sterner (1996) seem to be an appropriate way of handling the problem.
Since the discount rate appears questionable as a point of approach for assuring
intergenerational justice, economists have developed the alternative approaches
of shadow projects and reinvestment to ensure just distribution. What is known
as the Hartwick Rule (Hartwick, 1978, 972) demands that the economic rents
from the consumption of exhaustible resources should be reinvested in
reproducible capital. One example here would be to reinvest the rents from the
burning of fossil raw materials in the development of renewable energies. The
concept of shadow projects applies this rule to the environment’s assimilative
function, and demands that environmental damage should be compensated for
by substitutional action (MARKANDYA AND PEARCE, 1991, 150). For both cases,
it is noteworthy that welfare theory’s criterion of hypothetical compensation is
replaced by that of actual compensation.
The weakness of both these approaches is that they are based on purely
monetary units of measurement, and thus assume unlimited substitutability of
natural resources, i.e. they advocate a concept of weak sustainability.
4.2.2  Rawls’ theory of justice and the environmental space concept
In their search for a criterion of justice, resource economists occasionally
proceed from a Rawlsian „original position“ version of the social contract,
where citizens have to choose their preferred economic system from behind a
„veil of ignorance“, meaning that none of the protagonists possesses any
information on the position he/she will occupy in the future society concerned
(RAWLS, 1975). Rawls' theory of justice is thus an obvious choice for justifying
the demand for intra- and intergenerational justice. If the entire generation
living today were to decide on global distributions of income on the basis of
principles of justice thus derived, then every citizen could (under the veil of
ignorance as to whereabouts on earth he/she was to be born) be expected to opt11
for an assured subsistence level in the poorer countries. Under the term „veil of
ignorance“, Rawls also (1992, 61 f.) specifies that the parties (contemporaries)
do not know the comparatively good or bad fate of their generations, i.e. „they
have no information on the stocks of natural resources, the productive
capabilities, or the technological status involved, above and beyond what can be
deduced from the assumption that their use is governed by situational justice.“
To put it another way: sustainability or inter- and intragenerational minimum
standards can be legitimized under this approach in terms of contract theory, so
that following generations can indeed be reached by contract theory, though
they constitute the subject-matter rather than a contracting party.
On a political level, too, not only can broad agreement with the general
principles of sustainability be found in numerous reports and conventions, but
perceptible progress has been made in concretizing and implementing the
concept as well. Countries like Austria and the Netherlands have already
translated the general principles into national plans for the environment
(OPSCHOOR AND VAN DER STRAATEN, 1993; Österreichische Bundesregierung,
1995), and for the Federal Republic of Germany parliament has set up a
„Protection of Humans and the Environment“ commission of inquiry to
formulate a comparable plan (DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, 1995). Thus the political
goals of inter- and intragenerational justice can be substantiated not only by a
hypothetical Rawlsian „original position“ theory of the social contract, but also
by pointing to actual political plans and decisions.
In 1992, the environmental organization „Milieudefensie“ in the Netherlands
published its „Sustainable Netherlands“ study, whose central starting point was
the environmental space concept developed by Opschoor (1992) and the
principle of equal distribution, i.e. the conviction that sustainable development
is possible only if the environmental functions available are redistributed all
over the world on a basis of equity. Critics described this concept (which from
these principles calculates maximum per capita consumption figures for the
Netherlands' inhabitants) as a blueprint for eco-socialism, with elitist
evaluations transformed into prescriptive edicts on the population's true needs.
The German Wuppertal Institute, too, uses the environmental space concept in
designing a model for sustainable development (BLEISCHWITZ AND LOSKE ET
AL., 1995). However, the Wuppertal study repudiates the charge of introducing
a kind of planned economy. Equity is comprehended not in the sense of
socialism, prescribing an identical batch of commodities for each of its citizens,
but in the sense of equity of opportunity in satisfying one's needs and keeping
options open. This applies particularly to the distribution of finite
environmental resources between developing and industrialized nations. The
demand for equal distribution of global resources here entails a very far-12
reaching redistributive process, as can be easily demonstrated by adducing the
present-day differentials in greenhouse gas emissions. And precisely this
utilization of the atmosphere as a sink for greenhouse gases is an issue where
the industrialized nations will not be able to maintain their privileged position
indefinitely.
Overall, in the context of intra- and intergenerational distribution of
environmental goods, we can thus conclude that in terms of contract theory only
a minimum standard of subsistence can be legitimized for single individuals -
analogously to the social minimum standards in the social market economy. As
a distribution criterion for utilizing the environment as a sink for global
pollutants, however, only an equality principle between nations can be justified
in a long-term perspective.
4.3  Economic development
The requirement for economic efficiency in sustainable development is
reflected in Daly’s demand (1992, 186) for optimized scaling. This means that
additional environmental protection above and beyond maintaining the earth’s
ecological support capacity may still be worth doing. Additional environmental
protection measures are economically efficient for as long as the costs they
cause are lower than the benefits they create.
4.4  Integration of the elements involved
To arrive at an operative goal system for sustainable development, the
ecological, social and economic aspects, previously dealt with in isolation, must
be reintegrated into a coherent whole. Holistic approaches of this kind are
referred to as „new measures of welfare“, „new welfare models“ or as models
for „integrated assessment“.
4.4.1  Welfare measurement and sustainability indicators
One approach for integrating ecological, social and economic aspects is the
long-discussed expansion of the System of National Accounts (SNA). In many
of the world's countries, attempts are ongoing to develop an integrated
economic and ecological reporting system, designed to overcome the familiar
imperfections of gross national product (GNP) as a welfare indicator. It is
admittedly questionable whether GNP ever claimed to be a welfare model, and
thus whether (if there was never an „old“ one) we really need a „new“ measure
of welfare. Beyond a doubt, though, GNP as an indicator of economic strength
has led to a pronounced focus on economic growth targets, which should be13
expanded to include ecological and social objectives attuned to a holistic
sustainability concept.
A closer examination, however, reveals that so far there is no properly
integrated economic/ecological approach in existence: merely various
approaches which can be differentiated as either economically or ecologically
oriented in terms of their methodological origins. Economically oriented
approaches aim to integrate ecological aspects in the SNA scheme. In a thus
expanded environmental-economics national accounting system, GNP is to be
superseded by a new indicator, which will also subsume the costs for
environmental damage and the utility of environmental protection. Concepts for
indicators of this kind are being discussed under the headings of Green GDP
and sustainable income. The most advanced accounting system of this type is
the System for Integrated Economic and Environmental Accounting (SEEA) of
the United Nations.
But it is unrealistic to expect a new measurement of welfare to provide
quantified targets on which to base a policy of sustainability. Hueting’s concept
of sustainable income, for instance, is not intended to supply sustainability
standards; on the contrary, it presupposes the existence of these standards
(HUETING, 1991; RADERMACHER, 1993, 338 f.). Sustainable income is
calculated on the basis of specified political environmental standards, by
estimating the potential costs which would have to be incurred to achieve the
standards concerned. While public demands for a „green“ national product are
growing in number (VAN DIEREN, 1995), the researchers occupied with this task
have gained in modesty: The German Statistical Office (Radermacher, 1995,
21), for instance, sees it as „a major handicap that first of all certain social
decisions (emission standards, quality goals, etc.) have to be made. It is thus
clearly unrealistic to expect that a corrected growth figure from neutral
statistical accounting systems could replace or anticipate decision-making
processes“.
Due to the problems described above, economically oriented approaches are
amenable to long-term implementation at best. Ecologically oriented
approaches are now attempting to establish a satellite system to supplement the
traditional SNA, enabling auxiliary calculations, both monetary and non-
monetary in character, to be performed with application-specifically
systematized methodology. One example here is the Canadian stress approach
(FRIEND AND RAPPORT, 1991, P. 71), which is basically a classification scheme
for environmental data, dividing environmental indicators into the three
categories of environmental stress, state and social reactions. In the ongoing
international debate, wide acceptance has greeted the OECD's Pressure-State-
Response approach, a variant of the stress approach featuring the same14
categories. In order to integrate the social and economic aspects into indicator
systems as well as the ecological component of sustainable development, the
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has used this foundation to
develop the „Driving Force-State-Response“ approach (DSR) (UNITED
NATIONS, 1995). In line with Agenda 21, the DSR introduces additional
institutional indicators, and covers the following categories:
− driving force (social, economic, ecological development),
− state (status in terms of sustainability), and
− response (political options for sustainable development).
To sum up, we can say that the development of indicators for sustainable
development within the framework of an environmental-economics accounting
system is restricted to supplying information on major trends as a basis for
political decision-taking. Environmental economists deliberately avoid making
normative statements, or specifying target figures for sustainable development,
arguing that this is a job for politicians, not for statisticians. Nonetheless,
indicators using the DSR approach are very useful for politicians; after all, there
is still an option for closing the gap by specifying targets or drawing
comparisons with existing goals.
4.4.2  Deriving reduction targets
Numerous studies have attempted to derive concrete political goals from the
management rules for sustainable development. The trend here was set by the
Dutch section of Friends of the Earth and the Dutch Council for Environmental
Research, with their studies on a sustainable Netherlands (INSTITUTE FOR SOCIO-
ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH, no year given; WETERINGS AND OPSCHOOR, 1992).
When attempting to derive criteria for resource consumption, we immediately
come up against the operationalization problems already described in Chapter
4.1. The Dutch Council for Environmental Research, for example, arrives at a
pretty arbitrary formulation, to the effect that there should always be a sufficient
stock of non-renewable resources available to last for at least another 50 years,
and that human interventions in connection with renewable resources should
remain relatively slight in comparison with natural regeneration. Similar
problems emerge when deriving criteria for the impairment of ecosystems.
There is scientific substantiation only for the target figures on environmental
pollution, based on the concept of critical loads and levels. So it is hardly
surprising that more recent works, like the 1994 Report on the Environment
from Germany's Council of Experts for Environmental Questions, deal primarily
with air pollutants, while for landscape impairments the goals formulated are
predominantly qualitative in character. The „Sustainable Germany“ study from
the Wuppertal Institute, conversely, (BLEISCHWITZ AND LOSKE et al., 1995) is15
methodologically very close to the Dutch models, with some purely „political“
target figures added on, relating not to environmental quality, but directly to
action options like the use of energy carriers and nitrogen fertilizers.
The studies mentioned here can be comprehended as stimuli for society's debate
on environmental goals, which in the final analysis have to be specified by
political bodies. Due to the subjective nature of many normative assumptions
required for deriving reduction targets, academic advice can support, but not
replace this political process.
Achieving the targets involved will necessitate radical changes in
production/consumption patterns. Increasing eco-efficiency in production
operations is referred to as an efficiency strategy, while changes in behaviour
and consumption patterns are known as a sufficiency strategy. There are also
authors who regard an active population control policy as an indispensable
element in any policy of sustainability. PESTEL and RADERMACHER (1995, 9 ff.)
urge that the world's population should be reduced by a factor of 5 in the long
term.
Within the framework of a sufficiency strategy, concepts are being developed
for new forms of consumption and behaviour, encapsulated in buzzwords like
deceleration, deglomeration, decommercialization and a path to simplicity
(„back to basics“). Concepts of this kind are primarily used to illustrate the
meaning of abstract reduction goals for defined target groups. As political
recipes, however, against a background of the competitive model for
search/discovery procedures, they require critical scrutiny. MAIER-RIGAUD
(1994, 99) points out that: „Political orientation requires neither designs
defining a sustainably future-friendly development, nor proposals for solutions,
nor messages on new lifestyles. What really matters is creating the political
conditions in which the business community and society as a whole are able to
compete in discovering up-to-the-future solutions. We need socio-economic
search processes instead of counterproductive recipes and promises“.
5 Institutions for implementing a policy of sustainability
Analysing concepts of sustainable development in terms of regulatory policy
entails answering the question of the most adequate decision-making level for
each of the sub-goals concerned, i.e. one separate institution in succession for
each subgoal in a sustainable development concept. Space constraints preclude
such a detailed treatment here, so that we must focus on certain important areas
and institutional trends. After clarifying the basic principles involved in the16
relationship between subsidiarity and sustainability, we shall accordingly deal
with the establishment of long-term responsibilities and global institutions.
5.1  Subsidiarity and sustainability
Under the subsidiarity principle, institutional solutions must act on as low a
level as possible, i.e. priority must be accepted for decentralized solutions, due
to the informational, motivational and monitoring advantages involved. If
decision-making powers are to be shifted to a higher level, „good reasons“ have
to be adduced (EWERS AND HASSEL, 1995, 12).
In this context, it is helpful to evaluate the experience gained in concretizing
and implementing the subsidiarity principle in terms of the European Union's
environmental policies. In line with the subsidiarity principle, for a long time
the Community restricted itself to formulating the regulatory framework and the
general goals, while leaving it up to the member states to firm up the details and
implement the legislation. As JARASS (1994, 11) writes, this corresponded with
a reluctance on the part of member states to comply. Thus advocating
standardized implementation of environmental protection guidelines in order to
provide a level playing field will inevitably entail restrictions on the subsidiarity
principle.
The principles of congruence and equivalence are „good reasons“ for
responding to transnational problems (such as climate protection) with
transnational institutional solutions. Even problem areas like soil protection,
which at first sight would appear to be more local or regional in character, are
exhibiting signs of change on a global scale, which can be adequately treated
and controlled only by supraregional institutional solutions (WBGU, 1994,
186).
The relationship between the equivalence and subsidiarity principles is
obviously ambivalent in regard to the problems of sustainable development.
Wherever possible, decentralized solutions should be given preference. At the
same time, global change is unmistakably entailing a reinforced necessity for
international coordination and cooperation.
5.2  Ecological councils: the institutionalization of long-term
responsibilities
Sustainable development demands decisions reflecting an awareness of
responsibility for future generations. Politicians, conversely, are only elected to
relatively short periods in office, and thus will tend to place their short-term
interest in being re-elected over any long-term interest in the functioning of17
ecosystems. This is the reasoning behind the recurrent demands for taking far-
reaching decisions on our future out of the hands of democratically elected
parliaments and relocating them on a level where scientific expertise rather than
spin-doctoring are the determinant considerations (SRU, 1994, Tz. 81).
The German national bank is sometimes cited as a model for an independent
institution with long-term responsibility, whose assigned task it is to run a
professional, continuous, monetary policy based on long-view considerations,
and to prevent any hectic, politically motivated „stop-and-go“. Just as the
national bank decides the amount of money to be allocated to the economy on
the basis of the economy's real net output, so (runs the analogy) could a sort of
Eco-bank allocate resource consumption to the economy against economically
sensible and ecologically justifiable criteria. Another proposal is oriented on the
model of the German Academic Council, which formulates recommendations
on the development of universities and the academic and research communities
in general (GETHMANN AND MITTELSTRASS, 1992, 24 ff.). An Environmental
Council, runs the analogy, should formulate recommendations for
environmental standards. For the European Union, too, academics have
proposed an Ecological Council, to raise the status of environmental policy-
making (ÖKOLOGISCHE BRIEFE, 1994a, 7).
The problem involved with Ecological Councils of this kind would appear to be
their lack of democratic legitimization (ÖKOLOGISCHE  BRIEFE, 1994b, 4). In
addition, it must be doubted whether there can be a council possessing the
relevant expert knowledge in all the future-referenced questions pertaining to
sustainability. Finally, it must be remembered that in Germany, as in some other
countries there are already a large number of academic advisory bodies and
parliamentary commissions dealing solely with environmental questions.
5.3  The internationalization of environmental policies
To progress a policy of sustainability, intra or supranational agreements and
organizations must be used to substantivize binding commitments enabling the
world community to escape from the prisoners’ dilemma in which the overuse
of global environmental goods has enmeshed it. There are numerous approaches
for international cooperative self-commitment. Since the first UN
Environmental Conference in Stockholm, more than 60 multilateral
environmental agreements have been concluded, but as yet we do not have
much substantiated data on whether these contractual arrangements have been
able to make an effective contribution to coping with global environmental
problems. The question thus arises (most recently in the annual report from the
German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU, 1995, 59)) of whether18
the institutions involved in global environmental and resource policies require a
fundamental reform aimed at gearing them to sustainable development.
If a fundamental reform is to be implemented, LIPPOLD (1995, 11) recommends
that global environmental policy-making be anchored in institutions equivalent
in status to their counterparts for global security, economic and financial policy-
making. For this reason, he pleads for the establishment of an „Environmental
Security Council“ at the United Nations, on the model of the military Security
Council. Section 5.4 discusses the concept of a „UN Environmental Security
Council“, as well as alternative proposals for institutional anchoring of a global
environmental/resources policy.
The environmental effects of promotional programmes run by the World Bank
and the IMF are still being regarded with scepticism by many observers.
Increasingly, however, it is the environmental effects of foreign trade policy and
indeed the effects on foreign trade of environmental policies which are moving
to centre stage in the ongoing debate on international environmental policies.
And since the GATT regime has been significantly strengthened by the
establishment of the WTO, the remarks in Section 5.5 apply essentially to the
eco-relevant rules of this regime.
5.4  An Environmental Security Council of the United Nations
5.4.1  Concept and tasks
To work efficiently, any organization for implementing a global policy of
sustainability must be equipped with extensive powers, responsibilities and
monitoring prerogatives for global environmental and resource policy-making.
Its job in the community of nations could be derived from the existing job
definition for the UN, applying an expanded interpretation of the UN's security
and peace concepts (KILIAN, 1991a, 868 and HELM, 1995).
As an alternative to an exptended interpretation of existing tasks, the actual
Charta of the United Nations could be expanded, and a new job defined for the
UN in terms of global environmental and resource protection, so as to explicitly
enhance the status of environmentalist thinking, and thus also to underline the
perceived importance of environmental protection as fully equivalent to other
fields of policy-making. This procedure is a particularly attractive option if a
new organization is to be established in order to implement a global policy of
sustainability. The weight of this organization will be emphasized, and its tasks
and prerogatives can be unambiguously specified.
It would seem advisable to base the job definition of a global environmental
organization on Agenda 21. In view of the pressure exerted by international19
politics and international economic relationships, its powers must be maximally
wide-ranging (LIPPOLD, 1995, 10; FRENCH, 1995, 64 plus MEYERHOFF AND
SOETE, 1994, 23):
The job definition should include preparing the ground for internationally
negotiated restrictions on the principle of national sovereignty. This is why it is
so important to ensure efficient institutional arrangements for extending the
self-commitment mechanisms. The Montreal Protocol contains a progressive,
pathbreaking voting rule: more stringent regulations can, if a consensus is not
reached, be incorporated as binding for all parties in the agreement by means of
a qualified majority.
A global policy of sustainability should be flexible in design; in particular, a
global environmental organization should possess options for expeditious and
fast renegotiation of existing rules, enabling it to respond effectively to
changing trade flows and altered conditions in the global and national
economies.
A global policy of0 sustainability should be dominant over the GATT/WTO
regime. This requirement corresponds directly with the scaling requirement of
the sustained development concept. However, this does not imply that free trade
is incompatible with sustainability. But, it can no longer be the paramount goal
of the world community (as recorded in the GATT agreement of 1947) to
implement a „continually rising level of real income“. Nor does it appear
adequate when the new agreement for setting up a world trade organization
aims explicitly at economic growth, with simultaneous „utilization of the
world's resources in harmony with the goal of a sustainable development“ added
virtually as a parenthesis.
5.4.2  Organizations
Within the United Nations, besides UNCED and UNEP, bodies with their own
environmental policies (or whose fields of activity affect environmental policy
concerns) also include UNDP, UNCTAD, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, FAO and the
World Bank Group (KILIAN, 1991a and FRENCH, 1995, 65). If a single central
body is to be set up for handling global environmental policy-making, one of
the first priorities is accordingly to reorganize the UN's existing structure in the
environmental field, and to assign clear powers and prerogatives in regard to
handling questions of intra- and intergenerational utilization of the environment
and natural resources. Radical restructuring of the intermeshing institutional
bodies dealing with global environment and resource policies is being discussed
primarily in terms of two different concepts:20
− creation of an „Environmental Security Council“ at the United Nations
(Lippold, 1995, 12).
− upgrading the status of the United Nations' environmental programme
(UNEP) into a special UN organization with an expanded mandate (WBGU,
1995, 64).
The Environmental Security Council, says Lippold, should coordinate its global
solution strategies with global economic institutions (World Bank, IMF,
GATT/WTO) and regional economic bodies (e.g. EU, G7, OECD), to whom
important tasks would have to be delegated under the subsidiarity principle.
Besides the option of setting up an entirely new UN Environmental Security
Council, it would also be conceivable to redefine the function of the UN
Trusteeship Council to form a „UN Environmental Security Council“ or a „UN
Environmental Trusteeship Council“ (WBGU, 1995, 64).
To assess the second concept of upgrading the status of UNEP, the key question
is whether the UNEP environmental programme is fundamentally suited to a
role requiring it to implement a global policy of sustainability. Originally,
UNEP was to coordinate the environmental activities of all international
environmental institutions inside and outside the UN, and to serve as a catalyst
(KEIL, 1994, 83 and FRENCH, 1995, 65). Though Keil pays tribute to UNEP's
work and its role in progressing eco-awareness on an international scale, he sees
no outstanding successes, and often no tangible ones. Nevertheless, in view of
the experience gained by UNEP and the network it has meanwhile established,
he opts for upgrading UNEP's status and recognizing it as the sole
environmental programme within the UN. Or UNEP could perhaps be
incorporated as part of an entirely new agency.
Less optimism in regard to UNEP's perceived efficacy and utility as a
foundation for a central UN organization to deal with environmental and
resource-related questions is shown by authors like LIPPOLD (1995), ALTMANN
(1994) and KILIAN (1991b). The global decision-making structures to be
established should therefore, in Lippold's view, not be based on UNEP alone,
primarily since this organization, he feels, is not high-profile enough, and would
find it difficult to cope.
Taking an overall view, considering the sheer scope of the job involved, and the
responsibilities entailed by a global policy of sustainability, it appears advisable
to opt for the concept of a newly created central organization to deal with global
environmental and resource protection, conceivably by redefining the purpose
of the UN Trusteeship Council. UNEP, and perhaps UNDP as well, must be
integrated into this new organization. To enhance the institution's organizational
status in the UN set-up, and to define its tasks and powers, the UN Charter21
should be expanded to include a comprehensive definition of the UN’s role in
terms of global environmental and resource protection.
As long as an „Environmental Security Council“ or an alternative concept for a
global environmental organization cannot be implemented, we must continue to
progress the present practice of international conventions. Existing and future
agreements would then have to be integrated after a global organization had
been created.
5.5  Reform of GATT/WTO
When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was concluded
back in 1947, protection of the environment was not a major political issue, so
that environmental concerns were not given a specific mention. The agreement
was, however, always open for supplements or re-interpretations of existing
rules. That this did not happen is (as the German Advisory Council on Global
Change rightly remarks in WBGU, 1995, 179) primarily attributable to the eco-
political caution displayed by the major economic blocks.
When the Uruguay Round was concluded in early 1994, international trade
entered a more dynamic period: previously there had been GATT, an
internationally negotiated set of rules which had to be modified and extended in
repeated new rounds of negotiation. Now, with the World Trade Organization
(WTO), there was another, separate institution with its own juridical
personality, able to tackle new areas on its own initiative, and conceive new
rules on this basis.
From the wide field of study afforded by GATT/WTO and the environment, the
sections below will deal with the GATT-conformity of trade restrictions to
achieve extraterritorial environmental goals, the relationship between
GATT/WTO and existing environmental agreements, the problems involved in
the environment and subsidies, and the usability of GATT/WTO regulations for
measures of resource policy. In conclusion, appropriate proposals will be
formulated on how GATT/WTO as institutions can be developed in terms of
environmental and resource protection.
5.5.1  The GATT-conformity of ecologically motivated trade restrictions
The GATT/WTO system basically gives governments a free hand in defining
the national goals for their environmental policies, but difficulties arise when
measures are taken with a cross-border effect, which act to discriminate
between imports and domestic products, or between imports of like products
from different countries (non-discrimination), when the sovereignty of other
states is violated (extraterritoriality), or when national environmental standards22
affect justified trade interests of other contracting parties (REITERER, 1994, 480-
482).
Under the new GATT/WTO regime, there are only limited options for utilizing
foreign trade policy initiatives to achieve extraterritorial environmental
objectives. Permissible at best are non-arbitrary and not unfairly discriminating
measures for protecting the life and health of persons, animals and plants (Art.
XX(b) GATT) or for preserving exhaustible natural resources (Art. XX(g)
GATT). The latter only under the proviso that the trade related measures
concerned be taken in connection with restrictions on domestic production or
domestic consumption.
GATT’s rules in general relate first and foremost only to direct international
flows of materials and goods, consequently to internationally traded waste as
well. The methods and technologies used in cultivation, extraction and
processing (the primary concerns in a context of global environmental
problems) remain largely outside any control. The crucial point here is the
definition of the above-mentioned term „like products“. Differences in
geographical factors, cultivation methods, processing procedures or genetic
features have in GATT panel decisions (e.g. in the „non-dolphin-safe tuna“
dispute between the USA and Mexico in September 1991) not as yet been
regarded as sufficient grounds for differentiated treatment in foreign trade
(REITERER, 1994, 483).
The old GATT recognized conformity only for those standards relating to
characteristics inhering directly in the product (product standards). On the basis
of the new GATT/WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, processes
and production methods (PPMs) can now also be standardized. However, only
PPMs related directly to the product are covered by this. For example,
specifications for using recyclable materials are allowed, but not an import ban
on tropical timber produced without concomitant reforestation (SCHULTZ, 1994,
83).
But if restrictions on trade are nonetheless regarded as necessary for protecting
the global environment, this could be done in conformity with GATT's rules
within the framework of an international treaty on natural resources (Art. XX(h)
GATT) or an international agreement on the environment, modelled on the
Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. There
are, however, differences of opinion regarding the GATT-conformity of
existing international agreements on environmental protection. MEYERHOFF And
SOETE (1994) hold that although they are not compatible with GATT, they are
nonetheless being tacitly accepted. HELM (1995, 76) and SCHULTZ (1994, 104),
by contrast, contend that the GATT-conformity of trade-relevant provisions in23
international agreements on the environment has not yet been definitely
clarified. Existing and new agreements should therefore be legally validated in
terms of their conformity with GATT. It should be noted in this context that the
GATT-conformity of trade-related measures in international agreements on the
environment can be enacted by majority vote even without altering the existing
GATT/WTO regime. The ministerial conference can give an environmental
agreement priority over GATT/WTO, provided three quarters of the members
agree.
5.5.2  The environment and subsidies
Environmental protection and practised subsidization have several points of
contact. Firstly, the charge is made that non-internalized adverse environmental
effects represent a subsidy to production operations with less stringent
environmental standards than their rivals. Secondly, governmental assistance to
help companies adapt to environmental requirements is discussed.
The latter option is definitely in conformity with GATT, under Art. 2 (8.2c) of
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, provided the
companies concerned have been in existence for not less than two years, and
provided the environmental requirements involved result from laws and/or
ordinances.
The first-named aspect of locational competition is frequently referred to as
„environmental dumping“. However, dumping must not be confused with
subsidies: the latter are granted by governments, whereas the term „dumping“
describes the pricing policy of private companies. Under GATT's definition, a
charge of dumping is justified when companies can be proved to be applying
different prices which are not determined by costs but by the specific markets
being targeted (ROM, 1985, 226). It can hardly, however, be assumed that
companies are going to apply lower environmental standards to the production
process for export merchandise than to the manufacture of like products for
domestic consumption.
As an alternative to „environmental dumping“, consideration should be given as
to whether non-internalized adverse environmental effects constitute an
„environmental subsidy“ from the state, so that (in conformity with GATT)
trade-restrictive countermeasures would be justified. This, too, must be
answered in the negative, since inadequate environmental protection regulations
do not come under GATT's concept of subsidy (KULESSA, 1992, 304 and
SCHULTZ, 1994, 87).
To sum up, the existing GATT/WTO provisions cannot persuasively be
interpreted to define an offence called „environmental dumping“ or24
„environmental subsidy“, so that any corresponding countermeasures taken for
reasons of environmental policy will not be in conformity with GATT.
5.5.3  The usability of GATT/WTO provisions for resource policy
initiatives
Quantitative restrictions on foreign trade aimed at rendering resources
„artificially“ scarce are not in conformity with GATT (Art. XI), due to the
fundamental prohibition on quantitative restrictions for trade (Art. XI). There is,
however, provision for exceptions.
For example, GATT/WTO is no impediment to quantitative restrictions on
foreign trade arising from an international agreement on primary commodities
(Art. XX(h) GATT). If the restrictions concerned have been enacted in order to
conserve natural resources, this will under certain conditions be in conformity
with GATT as well, under Art. XX(g). The national endeavours of a heavily
forested country, for instance, to ban the import of non-sustainably produced
timber might indeed be in conformity with GATT, provided the sale of non-
sustainably produced timber from domestic stocks is prohibited at the same
time. Under certain circumstances, e.g. if the country concerned has no
significant forested areas, the trade-restrictive measure would, however, de
facto constitute a measure of extraterritorial environmental protection
referenced to „unrelated PPMs“, and would thus be in breach of GATT rules.
Further clarification is required here.
5.5.4  Basic principles for an ecological reform of GATT/WTO
The deficits and ambiguities of the GATT/WTO regime in relation to
environmental problems, as outlined in the preceding sections, highlight the
necessity for an ecological reform of the regime. The German Advisory Council
on Global Change proposes (WBGU, 1995, 187) that any such reform should
incorporate the principles listed below:
− If a trade-related measure is used to progress ecological interests, then the
state taking the trade-related measure concerned shall have a justified
environmental interest in so doing.
− Every trade-related measure which a state takes in order to achieve
environmental goals must also involve a reasonable contribution by the state
concerned to eliminating the adverse environmental effect targeted by the
measure in question.
− Trade-referenced measures shall relate to concrete environmental goals, be
reasonable in scope, and non-discriminatory in their range.
− Cooperative solutions should always be the primary aim.25
A justified interest in terms of environmental policy will always apply in the
case of cross-border effects arising from international environmental problems
(greenhouse gases, extinction of species). Criteria have to be laid down for
defining impermissible uses of the environment and describing permissible
trade-related countermeasures, without neglecting questions of intergenerational
justice, i.e. taking the history of the environment’s utilization in the present-day
industrialized nations into account as well. If appropriate, compensatory
mechanisms must be established for the renunciation of environment utilization
options in countries of the Third World.
One example of how GATT/WTO could be progressed in terms of
environmental problems is offered by the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which establishes a free trade area between the USA,
Canada and Mexico. Environmental aspects were of some importance for
congressional approval, so that a relatively sophisticated body of rules had to be
created (SCHULTZ, 1994, 78-79; see also ESTY, 1994).
It can be foreseen that the topic of foreign trade and the environment will take
on major importance in future GATT/WTO negotiating rounds. In Marrakesh, a
separate Committee for Trade and the Environment was set up specifically to
address these questions. Trade-related measures with extraterritorial
environmental impact will play a particularly prominent role, since (as
explained above) the existing GATT/WTO regulations offer almost no fruitful
points of approach in this context (HELM, 1995, 3). The committee’s remit is to
identify the interrelationships between trade and the environment, and to make
any appropriate recommendations for changes in the multilateral trading system.
It has also been asked to formulate proposals for its cooperation with any
relevant supranational and non-governmental organizations (REITERER, 1994,
493).
6 Instruments for implementing a policy of sustainability
6.1  Regulatory policies and instruments
STREIT (1979, 91) defines regulatory policy as „the provision of an institutional
infrastructure, with the purpose of establishing a selected economic system and
helping to safeguard it, as well as modifying it as appropriate“. The
privatization of environmental goods (Coase's solution) under regulatory
aspects of policy will accordingly constitute the most advantageous solution.
The requirement for governmental action is here restricted to a „one-off
political act of legislation“ (WEGNER, 1994, 10) or the taking of a basic decision
of regulatory policy regarding the allocation and specification of property
rights, with only allocative control of the environment's utilization being left to26
the market. However, regulatory measures alone in the tradition of Coase’s
solution will frequently fail in environmental matters simply because for many
environmental goods there is no exclusionary technology available.
Moreover, most environmental economists agree that ideal allocative solutions
rooted in welfare theory can no longer serve as models for practical
environmental policy-making, and we must turn to „politically responsive
solutional approaches“. This entails an unambiguous rejection of „the
regulatory idea of an endogenous goal formulation“ as a control norm of the
kind contained in property-right privatization models (WEGNER, 1994, 25).
As a postulate for regulatory policy-making, Wegner (1994, 26) builds on
Hayek's ideas of development to formulate the demand that environmental-
economic corrections to market processes be implemented only insofar as the
market's dynamics of development are not endangered. This means that to be
wholly acceptable in terms of regulatory policy-making, environmental policies
must firstly contribute to innovative creation of internalization options, and
secondly must not implement a policy of permanent regulation, which through
continual post-intervention will trigger a lasting increase in the economy's
transaction costs.
Table 2 provides - in broad conformity with the Enquete-Commission of the
German Bundestag (1994) - an overview of the instruments which will be
examined below against the regulatory criteria presented in Chapter 3 above.27
Table 2: Instruments of environmental policy
Instruments of environmental policy











- environmental management and eco-
  audit
- corporate environmental accounting
- ecological marketing
- cooperative solutions (eg. voluntary
  agreements)
- etc.





Command-and-control instruments in the form of mandatory and prohibitory
requirements constitute the classical range of instruments for environmental
policies aimed at averting dangers. The economic instruments are then, on the
basis of the above considerations and in broad conformity with EWERS And
BRENCK (1995, 190), classified in terms of whether they presuppose a state
management concept or not.
The first of these categories includes the environmental taxes conceived under
the standard-price-approach (BAUMOL, OATES AND WALLACE, 1971), together
with tradable permits. A state management concept is not required in the case of
instruments relating to property rights, like the privatization of environmental
goods and environmental liability legislation. This latter constitutes an
internalization strategy, which under ideal model conditions leads to optimum
damage avoidance by obligating the polluter to provide compensation for any
damage he causes (see e.g. ENDRES, 1994; CANSIER, 1993).
Classifying burden-sharing environmental subsidies as economic instruments is
not without its problems. In the form of tax incentives and investment aid they
serve to support the polluter-must-pay principle by aiming to overcome
financial bottlenecks impeding expeditious implementation of environmental
protection initiatives (see German Federal Government, 1986, 13).
When it comes to informational, organizational and voluntary instruments, the
rest of this paper will focus mainly on regulatory monitoring of voluntary
agreements, categorized as „associatory cooperative solutions“, and used as28
alternatives to regulatory or fiscal measures (FÜHR, 1995, 140). Voluntary
agreements represent voluntary unilateral declarations by sector-specific
associations designed to avert the enactment of stricter laws or statutory
ordinances (KLOEPFER, 1991, 740).
6.2  Assessing the instruments against the criterion listing
6.2.1  Goal-conformity
Command-and-control instruments represent the most goal-conformant option if
emissions have to be reduced in the immediate vicinity of particular facilities in
order to avert dangers, and for ecological reasons relocational reactions by the
operators involved are seen as undesirable. If, however, environmental policy
aims at reducing the total quantity of emissions, then facility-specific regulatory
instruments are less goal-conformant, since they do not address the total
emissions as the control variable. Enforcement deficits also have an adverse
effect on the speed of goal attainment by regulatory measures (LÜBBE-WOLFF,
1995, 112 ff., 174 ff.).
Solutions involving taxes and tradable permits provide the companies higher
degrees of individual freedom and flexibility, which in emergencies may delay
prompt elimination of an environmental risk. The relative strength of
environmental taxes and tradable permits is thus primarily in the field of
preventive environmental protection. Whereas tradable permits (given
appropriate spatial differentiation) will precisely guarantee compliance with
quantified ecological targets, taxes and levies are less goal-conformant: here,
information deficits at the governmental agencies concerned regarding the
avoidance costs may lead to uncertainties of steering (NAGEL, 1993, 71). For
this reason, taxes and levies are frequently discussed as a parallel instrument for
„supplementing and enriching the options for practical environmental policies“
(BONUS, 1990, 354) and practised in the Federal Republic of Germany in the
form of what is called a „residual pollution charge“ in the statutory water code.
Theoretically the same ecological steering effect as with taxes can be achieved
with environmental subsidies in the form of „emission reduction subsidies“
(CANSIER, 1993, 140 ff.). This theoretical model, however, is open to criticism
for flaws like the system's high information requirement or the long-term
economic inefficiency caused by transmission of incorrect price signals. In
practical environmental politics, the main job of environmental subsidies is to
supplement and to support the range of regulatory instruments available. But
any further ecological goals are almost impossible to achieve. HANSMEYER And
SCHNEIDER (1990, 53) advocate, especially in the transitional phase of
environmental policy (towards wider utilization of economic instruments) the29
use of state-financed promotional programmes, contributing incentives for
sophisticated avoidance activities, and helping to eliminate information deficits.
Liability legislation may supplement the implementation instruments of a
sustainability policy in areas where the state does not yet possess information
on environmental damage or where the issue is solely the avoidance of liability-
relevant reparable damage (LÜBBE-WOLFF, 1995, 52 ; SRU, 1994, Tz. 567). In
the form of liability for default, there are only incentives to comply with the
statutory standard for due care and diligence. Under the regime of absolute
liability, there may be, above and beyond this, incentives to avoid damage
arising from emissions in normal operation hitherto approved by the statutory
authorities. However, the absolute liability regime cannot be utilized for
implementing politically specified emission reduction targets either, since the
degree of environmental quality will emerge endogenously from the market
itself. In reality, the ecological efficacy of liability legislation will be severely
restricted, e.g. because most environmental damage comprises long-term
summation and long-distance damage categories, not permitting assignment to
the particular polluters involved. When it comes to preventive environmental
protection, in particular, seeking its effects below the relevant risk thresholds,
mandatory liability and insurance are completely unsuitable options (LÜBBE-
WOLFF, 1995, 52 f.).
Due to their legally non-binding character, and their resultant non-
enforceability, voluntary agreements entail a risk that companies or industry
confederations will seek to evade their formal obligations. Moreover, the
bartering character of voluntary agreements means that the state has to accept
substantive or temporal cutbacks in its environmental requirements so as to
elicit from the business community any commitment at all to voluntary action
(HARTKOPF AND BOHNE, 1983, 229). Voluntary agreements are thus
presumptively goal-conformant only in certain applications, e.g. when the
agreed goal triggers only marginal differences in interests between the state and
the business community, and does not run significantly counter to corporate
self-interest (MURSWIEK, 1988, 988). When more ambitious goals are involved,
the parallel use of „hard“ regulatory or economic instruments and/or a credible
threat of legislatory action by the state will be indispensable. The use of
voluntary agreements must be ruled out when it comes to averting dangers or
when there is immediate cause for concern (FÜHR, 1995, 143).
6.2.2  System-conformity
The command-and-control approach uses instruments of a centrally
administered economy where the scarcity of environmental goods and the
allocation of pollution potentials to the individual environment users is handled30
by a centralized state institution (KNÜPPEL, 1989, 133 f.). The extent to which
command-and-control instruments will limit individual options for action
depends on their specific nature (technology-referenced requirements, for
example, will restrict scope of decision-making more than emission-referenced
requirements). Prohibitions, designed solely to prevent particular ecological
damaging options for action, frequently offer a wider degree of freedom than do
mandatory prescriptive requirements, and may thus indeed be nearer to free-
enterprise principles. Compared to other instruments, however, the state’s
process-political interventionary intensity is at its greatest in the case of
statutory environmental requirements (KNÜPPEL, 1989, 134).
In comparison to regulatory instruments, where the legally permissible „residual
pollution“ remains financially unburdened, in the case of taxes and tradable
permits the polluter-must-pay principle is implemented more systematically. In
the German federal government's view, the polluter-must-pay principle accords
with the basic thinking behind the social market economy, since in this system
„as a matter of principle, all internal and external costs are assigned to the
products or services which cause the particular costs concerned“ (German
Federal Government, 1986, 12 f.). Economic instruments oriented on the
polluter-must-pay principle must accordingly be classified as more system-
conformant than governmental regulatory requirements.
Compared to command-and-control instruments, environmental taxes provide
more scope for behavioural choice, since they constitute an „indirect,
behaviour-inducing and not behaviour-prescriptive state intervention“
(REICHMANN, 1994, 132). The prospective taxpayer concerned can choose
between reducing his use of the environment, or preferring to pay the tax
involved. These regulatory advantages of taxes will accordingly be manifested
only where (at least in the long term) there are options for avoidance. The scope
for action provided is all the greater the more directly the basis of assessment is
linked to the unwanted state of affairs. In contrast to tradable permits, under a
tax-based regime the price for an environmental good does not represent a
decentralized or free-market-driven scarcity price, but possesses the character of
an  „administered fixed price“, which merely imitates the market-driven
formation of scarcity prices (KNÜPPEL, 1989, 35).
Environmental permits, akin to the property-right-based Coase concept,
constitute the most system-conformant solution to environmental problems: the
state merely establishes an ecological framework in the form of a permissible
quantity of emissions. Only when the state actually intervenes on the license
market (e.g. in order to implement more stringent ecological goals) does the
concept of tradable permits acquire a process-political component (KNÜPPEL,
1989, 35 f.). Tradable permits grant companies a similar freedom of choice as31
do taxes or levies, since here, too, the individual transactor has the choice of
acquiring tradable permits or reducing his own emissions. The market prices
emerging on the markets for tradable permits may be interpreted as „shadow
prices for environmental restrictions“ (BONUS, 1990, 350).
Voluntary agreements give the business community maximized freedom in
deciding the means by which an agreed goal can be achieved. From a legal
viewpoint, however, there is a perceived danger that „with this quasi-corporatist
element of self-legislation the democratic principle and the safeguarding of
public welfare may be put at risk“ (KLOEPFER, 1991, 740). The market-
conformity of voluntary agreements at a sectoral level will critically depend on
whether when implementing the goals at the individual members of the
federation involved, recourse is had to market mechanisms, e.g. by introducing
intra-sectoral tradable permit models (KOHLHAAS and PRAETORIUS, 1994, 179).
In terms of regulatory policy, reservations are expressed concerning the case-
referenced character of voluntary agreements, as well as within the context of
anti-trust and competition laws (FÜHR, 1995, 143). The limits of the
reasonableness principle will thus be violated if „the state were to utilize
agreements no longer in isolated cases and in support of legally regulated
instruments as hitherto, but „on a broad front“. For by a network of agreements
it would impair not only free-enterprise competition, but also (since every
agreement requires a concession by the state) environmental concerns overall
(HARTKOPF AND BOHNE, 1983, 236).
6.2.3  Economic efficiency
The central economic criticism of command-and-control regulations is that they
do not permit any static allocative efficiency to be implemented on a national
and sectoral level (GAWEL, 1994, 52 ff.). For „subsequent correction“ of
inefficient command-and-control, flexibilization options (substitution options
for allocated environmental rights of use) are being discussed and/or practised;
these, however, basically leave regulatory enforcement untouched, and thus
exhibit only slight allocative effects (HANSMEYER and SCHNEIDER, 1990, 59).
Moreover, regulatory requirements are dynamically inefficient, since they
generate no economic self-interest in environmental innovations.
The allocative advantages of economic instruments are based on the fact that
the governmental decision-maker does not require so much information here,
e.g. he needs no precise information on the plant-specific avoidance techniques.
Rather, plant operators are given indirect incentives to themselves generate and
utilize the knowledge available to develop cost-cutting techniques.
In the theoretical ideal case, environmental taxes, with marginal abatement costs
balanced out, lead to cost-efficient implementation of governmentally specified32
environmental goals, and thus involve gains in economic efficiency. But on a
single-plant level too, environmental taxes and levies may exhibit cost
advantages over technology-referenced statutory requirements. Emission taxes,
especially, provide greater degrees of technological freedom, and thus
opportunities to choose the most affordable avoidance option for the particular
facility concerned (GAWEL, 1994, 56). Compared to statutory requirements, the
tax solution is also ascribed greater dynamic incentivization effects for
developing avoidance technologies.
Tradable permits also theoretically constitute a cost-efficient option for
implementing emission reduction goals. The actual model variants for tradable
permits, however, differ in terms of how far the spatial aspect of the pollution
rights has to be allowed for in order to avoid deleterious emission
concentrations (REHBINDER, 1994, 94 ff.). There may thus be a conflict of goals
between ecological and economic viability. The use of tradable permits would
accordingly appear, not least for reasons of economic efficiency, particularly
promising for air pollutants with a global effect, or for quantity control in the
field of closed systems, such as indirect dischargers into the municipal sewage
system (HANSMEYER AND SCHNEIDER, 1990, 58). Tradable permits are
frequently described as less dynamically efficient than environmental taxes,
since as technical progress advances the permit price will fall, which at a given
total emission level will result in reduced incentives for further innovations
(EWERS AND BRENCK, 1995, 131). Additional reductions in emissions can (in
contrast to the tax solution) be implemented only by boosting the system’s
dynamics from the outside (BONUS, 1994, 3).
Voluntary agreements may under certain conditions indeed constitute efficient
instruments, since they permit a high degree of flexibility in implementing
ecological goals (CANSIER, 1993, 138). Efficient implementation of
environmental goals within a particular sector of industry is particularly
endangered by the free-rider problem, which is all the more exigent the more
unhomogeneous the sector concerned is, and the more companies belong to it.
Moreover, a uniform price signal for environment utilization will not be formed,
depriving the individual federation members of a basis for decision-making.
Thus efficient allocation is by no means assured, and in fact rather improbable.
And voluntary agreements provide no stimuli for technological advances going
beyond the agreed reduction target (KOHLHAAS AND PRAETORIUS, 1994, 177).
6.2.4  Institutional controllability
When examining institutional controllability for individual measures of
environmental policy, one question is how far these can be implemented in the33
ongoing political process, and another is what difficulties may occur when the
instrument concerned is utilized in the enforcement phase.
Governmental decision-makers prefer a policy of command-and-control over
other instruments, not least because of its high visibility and allocability
(GAWEL, 1992, 275; BENKERT, 1994, 50). When implementing command-and-
control measures, moreover, comparatively slight resistance can be anticipated
from the business community and the civil service (FABER, STEPHAN AND
MICHAELIS, 1988, 99). The possibilities for abuse in the administrative
apparatus lie, for instance, in the necessity for continual intervention, and the
concomitant over-complexity of regulatory provisions, as well as in serious
enforcement deficits.
Both on the part of governmental decision-makers and the civil service, and
from the sectors of industry affected, there is considerable resistance to
environmental taxes, partly based on a general aversion to institutional
innovations, the concomitant reshuffling of prerogatives within civil service
departments and corporate hierarchies, and (compared with a regulatory
approach) the higher and sometimes incalculable cost burdens for industry
(FABER, STEPHAN AND MICHAELIS, 1988, 99). The opportunities for political
abuse with environmental taxes are seen particularly in the possibility that the
revenues thus generated will be welcomed by the Treasury as an inexhaustible
source of income, whereas steering goals of environmental policy will have to
take a back seat. This poses a danger to goal-conformity, not to mention the
possibility that corporate cost burdens will escalate to a level unacceptable
within the regulatory framework (BONUS, 1990, 357). Thus the implementation
of revenue-neutral tax reform concepts also involves inherent difficulties.
However, ensuring revenue-neutrality is more of a political problem than one of
taxation methodology (LINSCHEIDT AND TRUGER, 1994, 444).
The introduction of tradable permit systems is currently on the back burner, due
to the lack of practical experience with this instrument so far, and to the lack of
a consensus regarding the allocative procedures for the emission rights.
Furthermore, the permit price for the environment user cannot be calculated ex
ante, and the polluters fear that successes in the reduction of pollutants (which
will be directly manifested in a price slump) will encourage the state to
immediately enact a more stringent ecological framework.
Above all, voluntary agreements exhibit an incentivization problem in the
implementation phase and a monitoring problem in the enforcement phase. This
incentivization problem inheres in the fact that industrial associations must, in
their own self-interest, commit themselves voluntarily to the environmentally
sound behaviour desired. Particularly when ambitious reduction targets are34
involved, this incentivization problem can be solved only if the state credibly
threatens to introduce even more restrictive legislation, designed to come into
force if voluntary agreements fails. The monitoring problem inheres in the fact
that normally the goals concerned have not been specified in legally binding
form, and thus in the event of non-compliance no legal action can be taken or
sanctions imposed.
7 Conclusions
To evaluate in terms of their regulatory efficacy the goals, institutions and
measures for describing and implementing sustainable development, the first
requirement is a set of check criteria. An analytical raster of this kind has been
formulated as part of this study, and comprises the following steps: goal
operationalization and legitimization, institutionalization, and instrumentation:
− In developing a goal system, it is crucial to define consistent subgoals,
demonstrably able to correct the deficits of a pure free-market system.
− When selecting the decision-making level, the primary consideration must be
to find a balance between the subsidiarity and congruence principles. While
the subsidiarity principle basically favours decentralized solutions, the
criterion of objective congruence demands that global problems be tackled on
the level of supranational institutions.
− Finally, any assessment of instruments will in terms of regulatory efficacy
concentrate on criteria of effectiveness (goal-conformity), necessity (system-
conformity), economic efficiency, and institutional controllability.
The way in which sustainability goals are formulated is highly relevant in terms
of regulatory policy-making. Starting from regulatory considerations,
maximally differentiated, impact-oriented policy goals (i.e. environmental
quality indicators) must be paramount in any system of sustainability indicators.
The less specifically the goals of sustainable economic management are
defined, the more likely they are to result in concepts of dubious regulatory
utility, tending towards blanket restrictions in economic activities and economic
growth as such. Formulation of sustainability goals must therefore satisfy the
principle of necessity and the postulate of maximising freedom under given
ecological restrictions
If these basic principles are followed, the targets derived from them can be
legitimized, even when applying strictly neo-liberal criteria for evaluating
economic policy measures. Reduction targets of this kind do not (despite
recurrent warnings to the contrary) signify a descent into an eco-dictatorship,
but quite the reverse: a necessary expansion of liberal constitutions for the
economy. A conclusion drawn from the insight that the market cannot of itself35
guarantee the preservation of ecological support capacity. Ensuring ecological
carrying capacity thus additionally demands a framework of sustainability.
Institutional implementation of the principles of sustainable development is
primarily characterized by the ambivalent relationship between the equivalence
and congruence principles. From a regulatory viewpoint, decentralized solutions
should always be given preference. Global change, however, entails a
heightened necessity for international coordination.
As yet there have been no totally persuasive proposals for the establishment of
ecological councils capable of assuming long-term responsibilities in
democratic decision-making processes otherwise focused on the short term. The
fundamental problems involved in these proposals usually stem from the
inadequate democratic legitimization of such councils, and in over-ambitious
ideas concerning the scientific expertise of the members concerned, which
would have to cover all the specialized fields involved  in sustainable
development. It would appear more sensible to strengthen the existing councils
and commissions.
Regarding the institutional revamping of global environmental policy-making,
in view of the sheer scope of the job and the responsibilities involved for a
policy of sustainability, it appears advisable to create a new, central
organization for global environmental and resource protection.
The deficits and ambiguities of the GATT/WTO regime in regard to
environmental problems highlight the necessity for an ecological reform. One
example is offered by the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement),
which establishes a free trade zone between the USA, Canada and Mexico.
Environmental aspects were of some importance for congressional approval, so
that a relatively sophisticated body of rules had to be created.
It can be foreseen that the topic of foreign trade and the environment will take
on major importance in future GATT/WTO negotiating rounds. The objective
should be to seize this opportunity to put through substantive reforms:
conceivable initiatives would include a comprehensive anchoring of the
precautionary principle, reversing the burden of proof in favour of the
environment when invoking environmental goals (on the model of NAFTA),
expanding the ambit of Art. XX to cover protection of the environment,
international harmonization of product and production standards, classification
of externalized environmental costs as impermissible subsidies, plus regulations
designed to deter governments from entering into a competition for direct
investments from abroad, via watered-down or inadequately enforced
environmental legislation/regulations (on the model of NAFTA) (KULESSA,
1992; ALTMANN, 1994; SCHULTZ, 1994, and HELM, 1995). The selection of36
criteria for determining permissible utilization of regional and global
environmental functions is of central importance in this context (WBGU, 1995,
181); and the specific interests of the developing countries must be adequately
allowed for.
An analysis of environmental policy instruments in terms of their regulatory
efficacy requires that they be evaluated against a variety of problem
constellations. Not only must a distinction be drawn here between averting
dangers and making provision for risks; the nature of the market’s failure in
each case (external costs, inflexibility, lack of information) and the level of
informed public opinion on possible environmental damage must also be taken
into account. Table 3 provides an overview of environmental policy instruments
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